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but they did have the concept of the natural powers of things. So an event which
we might describe as transgressing a law of nature they might describe as
exceeding the natural powers of the creatures involved.
9. In his fullest example of how a reported miracle might be assessed (on p.
161), he makes use of a pattern of supposed miracles. (The example is contained
in the offset material above in the text.)
10. In his example on p. 161, Houston speaks of "well-attested reports" and
"reports of some weight." Moreover, part of his reason for discounting miracle
reports in other religions is the poor quality of their attestation (204-205).
11. Of course, if God continued to perform highly public miracles today to
confirm revelation, the quality of the documentation of biblical miracles would
not matter. But God does not do this either. To be sure, some people do claim
that God is performing miracles today, but most people never experience anything which seems to be a candidate for being a miracle; moreover, those who
claim to experience miracles usually are already believers, so they have far less
need for the confirmation than does the neutral, open inquirer to whom Houston
proposes his methodology.
12. The tension between attributing a revelation-confim1ing purpose to miracles, on the one hand, and the pattern of occurrence of purported miracles and
the quality of their documentation, on the other, is explored in my article" A
Moral Argument against Miracles," Faith and Philosophy, 12 (January 1995).

The Greater Good Defense: An Essay on the Rationality of Faith, by Melville
Y. Stewart. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. Pp. xi and 202. $55.00.
JANE MARY TRAU, Allegany Health System, Tampa
Stewarts' text should become a standard on reading lists for students of
philosophical theology. As a classroom text, it offers an accessible introduction to the dominant trends in contemporary Christian apologetics.
This is not meant to imply that Stewart's treatment is any way superficial, but that he elucidates in a straightforward manner such complexities as Plantinga's "trans world depravity" and Molina's "middle knowledge." As a precursor to primary sources, this text lays out with precision and clarity the basic conceptual problems and lines of defence to be
studied in greater depth.
Stewart's thesis is that much of Christian theodicv can be subsumed
under a general category of defence, viz. the gre"'ater good defence
(GGD). He then focuses on several specifications of that defence: the
free-will specification; the growth to moral maturity / soul-growth
defence specification; and the redemption specification (related to the 0
Felix Culpa approach). In consideration of each of these specifications
Stewart presents a concise review of the works of Keith Yandell, Alvin
Plantinga, John Hick, and refers to Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas.
He offers a knowledgeable account of the important critiques each of the
three contemporary thinkers have attracted, and provides some able rescue attempts for each account. Stewart, however, does not attempt to
provide a theodicy himself. In the end he offers his own specification of
the GGD, the R-specification ( R = redemption), as a prop for the claim
that belief in God is rational despite the existence of evil. Rational justifi-
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cation of belief is Stewart's goal.
Stewart begins the work with a thorough statement of the problem the
existence of evil presents for those who believe in the God of Christian
theism. He then presents an analysis of the claim that God does not exist,
or the claim that God probably does not exist. Though Stewart does not
stress the distinction, he focuses on the argument from evil against God's
existence, rather than the problem of evil, which is perceived by some
theodicists to be a pastoral rather than a philosophical issue.
Stewart's first chapters begin, as do many theodicies in the Christian
tradition, with a discussion of the divine attributes, viz. omnipotence,
omniscience, and omnibenevolence. The question considered is whether
the existence of evil implies that the God of Christian theism simply
does not exist, or that any god who may exist could not possibly fit that
description?
The familiar issue raised by this question pertains to whether any limitations upon the actions taken by God would imply that God is limited.
For instance, if God cannot do something that is logically impossible, or
which is logically inconsistent with a compossible set of events, does
that reality impugn the omnipotence of God? Stewart concludes, after
citing the responses of Aquinas, Abelard, and Plantinga, that it does not.
"These understandings of the divine predicates in question lomnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolenceL are not viewed as logically
incompatible, so they can belong to one and the same being ... We will
assume that there is a coherent sense that can be given to each and that
the attributes are logically compossible. Whatever problems remain are
judged to be minor, needing only minor revisions at most." (54-55).
Though this may sound like Stewart accepts the divine predicates traditionally associated with Christian theism, it also appears that he does
allow some weakening with respect to omniscience (Chapter Two), if
one includes divine foreknowledge as an integral part of omniscience.
Stewart provides a simple (though not simplistic) explanation of the
relation between truth and counterfactuals, and how knowledge of
counterfactuals depends upon when those counterfactuals become actual. If it is reasonable to say that neither God or anyone else can know
that p is true, until it is true, then God's foreknowledge of p's truth may
be impossible. Stewart accepts that such an impossibility does not limit
God's omniscience. Though stalwarts may insist that omniscience
include God's knowledge that p will be true rather than not p, Stewart's
argument seems to prevail because his account of counterfactual 'knowledge' is conjoined with his account of the freedom of moral agents. The
longstanding objection that God's foreknowledge that p, rather than not
p, would impinge upon some agent A's freedom to do p rather than not
p, seems to be the real thrust of the argument, rather than the counterfactual strategy. The question is not whether God or anyone else could
know that p before p, but whether knowledge of p before p would obviate A's freedom to do p.
Stewart's chapter (3) on the greater good defence (GGD), presents the
GGD as derivative of the Ends Justifies the Means principle (EJM). He
then reviews the standard discussions on deontological versus teleologi-
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cal justifications for the existence of evil. I was disappointed that Stewart
stopped short of the conclusion I reached (Trau, The New Scholasticism,
1986) about gratuitous evil. He does go so far as to say,
... the critic of theism cannot know that E1 [any evil] lacks the
properties (P)[Being morally allowed by God, if God exists] and
(P**) [Being morally allowable by God] without also knowing
that God does not exist, just as it is the case that a theist cannot
know that E1 has the property (P*) [Being morally allowed by
God] without knowing that God does exist. (77)
I have put the case as follows:
One cannot move from the claim the
p: This instance of evil E has no apparent purpose (which is an epistemological claim, to the claim
p2: This instance of evil E in fact has no purpose (which is an ontological claim),
For it might be the case that
p3: There is some non-apparent purpose to E
I claim that the theist, at least some theists, believes p3 because she
believes that God does exist and may have some purpose for p3 known
only to God. Faith in God precedes the willingness to grant the hidden
purpose to E. The non theist assumes that p3 could not be true because
the most reasonable context in which p3 could be true, viz. that God
exists and has some purpose for E, has already been rejected. Thus I
conclude, though Stewart does not, that the most reasonable position
with respect to gratuitous evil, for both the theist and the non-theist, is
epistemological agnosticism; and the most reasonable approach for
theodicists and apologists is to reduce the weight given to instances of
apparently gratuitous evil in their deliberations.
Stewart's chapter (4) on derivations of the greater good defence, concentrating on the work of Keith Yandell, is quite good. I do take exception to Stewart's analysis of Yandell's account only because Stewart fails
to defend it against the presumption that an ultimately favorable balance of good over evil relies upon human persons occupying a privileged or superior position within creation. It is possible to hold that the
creation of moral beings necessitates freedom, which establishes the possibility of moral evil, without believing that the exercise of that freedom
or the creation of beings who possess that freedom is the greatest good
within that creation. One could simply say that a universe which
includes morally free beings is on the whole preferable to a universe in
which there are no moral agents (assuming that moral agency requires
freedom); and that a universe which includes human beings as equals
with other kinds of beings within a created environment fulfills that
preference.
Stewart's chapter on the free will specification of the GGO offers a
splendid account of Plantinga's overall approach. This chapter would be
ideal as an introduction to the corpus of Plantinga's work. The same com-
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ment applies to the chapter on the growth to moral maturity and soul
growth, focusing on the works of Yandell and Hick respectively. One disagreement I have with Stewart regarding his understanding of Hick carries
more weight when Stewart attempts to develop his own R-specification.
Stewart believes that redemption is the most promising aspect of
Christian theism in light of the GGO; best satisfies the logical requirements of GGO. He argues that redemption is the most promising aspect
of Christian theism in light of the GGD. Redemption requires a Fall; and
that Hick's theodicy does not necessitate redemption. Thus Stewart
rejects Hick's theodicy as a candidate for the R-specification of the GGD.
If redemption is the greater good which justifies, in fact requires moral
evil, then (Stewart claims) there must be a Fall. Stewart's claim rests on
his understanding of redemption as 'restorative.' If there were no
prelapsarian state from which human persons fell, then there would be
no need for restoration, and redemption would be gratuitous. Stewart is
willing to discard Hick's theodicy because it does not support Stewart's
R-specification of the GGO.
An alternative interpretation of redemption, viz. one which does not
imply restoration, could be used to establish the R-specification as consistent with Hick's theodicy. For instance, one could argue that the
'immature' state and imperfect environment in which human persons
are created is admittedly and essentially distinct from the likeness into
which they are called. 'Redemption' is the transfiguration from the creaturely state, i.e. bios, into the spiritual state, i.e. zoe. This notion of
redemption could satisfy the GGO, without introducing the Fall. Of
course Stewart would have to allow that restoration is not analytically
necessary to the concept of redemption. He is unwilling to grant that
Hick's account of 'epistemic distance' could function the way that the
Fall does in a specification of the GGO.
Stewart's construction of the R-specification is an attempt to fortify
the rational ground for belief in the God of the Christian tradition. He
concludes that moral evil has positive instrumental value, and is necessary for redemption. Redemption is the greater good which counterbalances or overbalances actual moral evil. Though his attempt is well
done, those who side with Hick will not easily grant Stewart the point
about the Fall. Other readers may experience a degree of discomfort
with Stewart's use of male pronouns when referring to God. On the
whole, it is an excellent and valuable contribution to the current obsession with making belief in God 'respectable.' Though it is not intended
as a work of conversion or passion, Stewart's work conveys a conviction
of belief which underlies his significant analytic enterprise. All students
and specialists of the field should take note.

